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Everyday w e ofer ourselves explanations for the thin gs we do and the choices we 
m ake, but how accurate are these introspections? Th is was a question fam ously 
tackled by Nisbet and W ilson in their sem inal rti cle: Teling m ore than w e can 
know: Verbal reports on m ental processes (1977). Th eir adical nd counter-intuitve 
answer w as that our introspections are confabulator y. 
 
'HVSLWHWKHVSODVKFUHDWHGE\1LVEHWWDQG:LOVRQ¶VDUWLFOHDQGWKHLUSURSRVHG
paradigm  for testing their hypothesis, no coherent research program m e em erged. This 
LVDVLWXDWLRQWKDW-RKDQVVRQDQGFROOHDJXHVKDYHVRXJKWWRDGGUHVVZLWKWKHLUµ&KRLFH
%OLQGQHVV3DUDGLJP¶&%3VHH-RKDQVVRQ+DOO6LNVWURP7DUQLQJ	/LQGFXUUHQW
issue).  
 
,QOLQHZLWK1LVEHWWDQG:LOVRQ¶VK\SRWKHVLVWhe CBP suggests hat our introspections 
are confabulatory. Johansson, Hal, Sikstrom , and O lsson (2005) presented 
participants w ith photographs of two fem ale faces, one of which they had to choose as 
EHLQJPRUHDWWUDFWLYH7KHµFKRVHQ¶SKRWRJUDSKZDVWKHQre -presented to the 
participant, who had to ofer a justifcation for c hoosing that photograph. 
Unbeknownst to the participant, the experim enters i nterm itently swapped the 
photograph that was chosen, and instead presented t he un-chosen one. Interestingly, 
Johansson et al found that when they presented to t he participant a photograph they 
had not in fact hosen, participants would neverthe less ofer a justifcation for that 
µFKRLFH¶ 
 
7KLVVWXG\DSSHDUVWREHDQHDWGHPRQVWUDWLRQRI1LVEHWWDQG:LOVRQ¶VK\Sothesis. 
Participants clearly ofered confabulatory explanat ions for choices they had not in fact 
m ade. The strength of this tudy lies in the fact t hat one can m ore clearly discern the 
real from  the confabulatory in these introspective reports. M oreover, Johansson, Hal, 
Sikstrom , Tarning, and Lind (this sue) reveal tha t real nd confabulatory reports 
difer very litlen term s of content. This findin g isparticularly teling. Itim plies that 
RXUMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRUµUHDO¶FKRLFHVPD\EHEDVHGRQWKHVDPe processes that generate 
justifcations for confabulatory choices. 
 
$NH\LVVXHLVKRZIDUZHVKRXOGDFFHSWWKHFRQFOXVLRQVRI-RKDQVVRQHWDO¶VVWXG\Is 
it the case that l our introspections are detache d from  reality in this way? The 
psychological li WHUDWXUHRQWKHIHDWXUHRIYROXQWDU\DFWLRQFDOOHGµDJHQF\¶SURYLGHVD 
dom ain where enough psychological data exist to add ress this concern.       
 
Agency, broadly construed, isthe abilty to intera ct w ith the environm ent through 
self-generated action. A gency involves pecifc neural processes, their phys ical 
consequences in the environm ent, and also a charact eristic conscious experience of 
action control.  W e can therefore ask ifthe consci ous experience of agency isbased 
on a confabulatory process of the sort posited by J ohansson et al,or on genuine, 
specifable inform ation internal to the processes o f action control. 
 
Daniel W egner and coleagues appear to suggest that i ntrospections on agency are 
confabulatory.  He w rites µ«ZHDUHQRWLQWULQVLFDOO\LQform ed of our own authorship 
and instead m ust build it up virtualy out of perce ptions of the thought and the actions 
we witness in consciousness (p. 218) ¶6XSSRUWIRUWKLVDVVHUWLRQFRPHVIUom  a 
num ber of sources. W egner and W heatley (1999) showe d that participants who were 
prim ed with an action-relevant thought prior to per form ing that action felt a 
heightened sense of agency, even when they them selv es did not perform  that 
particular action. Furtherm ore, an eroneous ense of agency can occur in various 
clinical conditons. For exam ple, patients w ith µXWLOLVDWLRQEHKDYLRXU¶ w il m ake wel-
form ed actions directed at objects in their environ m ent w ithout consciously intending 
the action.  They recognise the action istheirs, t hough they do not experience any 
intention to m ake it (M arcel, 2005). A lthough the a ction was not consciously 
intended, such patients w il nevertheless ofer pos t-hoc rationalisations for their 
actions. For exam ple, Boccardi , D ela Sala, M oto,  and Spinnler (2002) provide the 
folowing exam ple of a patient they tested w ith uti lisation behaviour: 
 
µ« while tsted, CU spoted an apple and a knife left  on purpose on a corner 
of the tsting desk. He peeled the apple and ate it . The exam iner asked why he 
was HDWLQJWKHDSSOH+HUHSOLHG³:HOOLWZDVWKHUH´³$UH\RXKXQJU\"´³1R
wel DELW´³+DYH\RXQRWMXVWILQLVKHGHDWLQJ"´³<HV´³,VWKLVDSSOH\RXUV"´
³1R´. ³$QGZKRVHDSSOHLVLW"´³<RXUV,WKLQN´³6RZK\DUH\RXHDWLQJLW"´ 
³%HFDXVHLWLVKHUH´¶S 
 
 
These experim ental nd clinical exam ples appear to provide convincing evidence in 
support of the hypothesis of confabulatory introspe ction. 
 
However, these are exceptions to t KHQRUP)RUH[DPSOHLQ:HJQHUDQG:KHDWOH\¶V
study, two agents participated in the experim ent, a nd a given environm ental efect 
could be caused either by one or by the other.  The refore the sense of agency w as 
highly falible. In the case of utilsation behavio ur, there isevere lsioning to the 
frontal lobes. In such cases, it m ay be the case th at our sense of agency isndeed 
confabulatory, but only when intrinsic sources of i nform ation are m ade am biguous 
WKURXJKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIRWKHUSRVVLEOHFDXVHVDVLQ:HJQHU	:KHDWOH\¶VVWXG\
or when they are im paired (as in the case of utils ation behaviour). Bayne and Levy 
(2006) point out that the lngths one has to go to in order to render the sense of 
agency falible dem onstrate the reliabilty of the underlying m echanism s.  
 
W hat direct evidence isthere that the norm al sense  of agency isvalid and reliable? A  
study by Fried et al (1991) suggests hat our sense  of agency m ay be generated by 
preparatory neural processes that lso generate our  voluntary actions. During a 
preoperative procedure, Fried and coleagues electr icaly stim ulated the 
supplem entary m otor area of neurosurgical patients.  A t low  curent levels the patients 
reported having urges to m ake particular m ovem ents,  and at higher levels they 
actualy m ade the m ovem ents hat they previously re ported an urge to perform . This 
result suggests hat WKHLQLWLDOµXUJH¶LVDQRUPDODFFRPSDQLPHQWRIWKHQHXUDO
processes that generate action.  Ifthe sense of ag ency were a confabulation, it would 
presum ably be triggered by sensory feedback of the action itself.  Each action would 
then require a retrospect LYHH[SODQDWLRQ+RZHYHU)ULHGHWDO¶VUHVXOWVXJJHVWVWKDW
an experience related to agency ispresent before a ny physical ction has occured.  
The sense of agency seem s to be based on internal inf orm ation generated by the 
neural m echanism  that isresp RQVLEOHIRUWKHDFWLRQ)ULHGHWDO¶VVWXG\argues against 
a confabulatory account of agency. 
 
A  com putational m odel of m otor control developed by W olpert and coleagues (see 
W olpert &  Ghahram ani, 2000, for a review) supports the assertion that our sense o f 
agency m ay be introspectively valid. On this view, the contents of conscious 
awareness m ay include predictions m ade by feed-forw ard m odels w ithin the m otor 
control system  (Blakem ore, W olpert, &  Frith, 2002).  This could also explain the Fried 
et al findin JVDERYHWKHSDWLHQWV¶FRQVFLRXVLQWHQWLRQVWRPRYHDSSHDUHGWREHEDVHG
on the sam e processes involved in the generation of  the m ovem ent 
 
A  recent sudy by M oore and Haggard (in prep.) prov ides further support for the idea 
that our sense of agency isntrospectively valid. Previous tudies have show n that 
voluntary actions and their efects are perceived c loser together in tim e than is
actualy the case (H aggard, Clark, &  K alogeras, 200 2). This has been term ed 
µLQWHQWLRQDOELQGLQJ¶M oore and H aggard used this finding to see whether the binding 
efect was dependent on the actual occurence of th e efect, or on the prediction that 
the efect w il occur. By m anipulating the predicta bilty of the efect (a tone), we 
showed that, where predictabilty was high, actions  showed a binding efect even in 
the absence of the tone. W here predictabilty of th e efect w as low, there was no such 
shift. To the extent that the binding phenom enon is  taken as an aspect of the sense of 
agency, this finding suggests a predictive com ponen t to agency. The sense of agency 
appears to be based, at least in part, on predictio ns of the sensory consequences of our 
actions.  Predictions are clearly not confabulation s.  
 
The picture em erging isthat introspections are pro ne to confabulation where the sense 
of agency isfalible. However, when the sources of  falibilty are rem oved, the 
internal inform ation we have about our own agency i s m ore reliable and m ore valid. 
Does CBP fal into the form er cluster of cases in w hich the states we introspect on (in 
this case m otivations for action ) are artifcialy m ade falible?  
 W e suggest CBP is  an aberant case of this kind. For exam ple, in the  CBP the choice 
that ism ade isdecidedly unim portant; it isunlike ly that people profoundly care 
whether or not a face isatractive or not. -RKDQVVRQ¶VVXEMHFWVFRXOGPDNHVHQVHRIthe 
trick situation in one of two ways.  First, they co uld accept that the action that they 
m ade did not have the desired efect (showing the f ace that they had intended to 
choos e) .  They would thus accept failed agency.  A lternati vely, they could 
confabulate new reasons for their action, which w ou ld retrospectively redefine their 
action as uccessful.  In the artifcial situation of the CBP experim ent, confabulation 
is an easier PHWKRGRIµVHQVH-PDNLQJ¶WKDQDFFHSWLQJfailed agency.  A  convincing 
refutation of this critcism  would be a dem onstrati on of the CBP efect for decisions 
regarding m oral issues, for exam ple. These would be  decisions that re presum ably 
less falible and m ore resistant to confabulation.  
 
Another key issue regarding the falibilty of intr ospection in the CBP isthe 
experim enter-participant dynam ic. There m ight be a feeling on behalf of the 
participant that whilst they suspect a m ism atch bet ween their ntention and itsefects, 
they are unwiling to adm it as m uch to the experim e nter. A gain, this could be tsted 
by geting participants o justify choices that re  of a m ore im portant nature, or 
alternatively by giving participants independent ev idence that their ntentions w il 
som etim es m iscary.         
 
However, we should diferentiate between DFFHVVWRRQH¶Vreasons for perform ing an 
action, and access to the sense of agency itself (i ncluding intentions, authorship, 
conscious w il, and so on). CBP appears to fal int o the form er class of cases, where 
the task isto introspect on the reasons for a choi ce, not on the process of choosing 
itself. W e suggest that confabulation about the rea sons for acting ism ore com m on, 
whilst confabulations about the sense of agency its elf are lim ited to unusual situations 
of am biguity or im pairm ent.  W e generaly know abou t our own actions when we 
perform  them , though we m ay be confused or self-dec eptive about why we perform  
them .  For exam ple, in a situation of guilt, we com m only think of retrospective 
justifcations or excuses for our action, while not  denying that w e perform ed it. 
 
W hilst we welcom e the introduction of the CBP as a useful experim ental m ethod, we 
suggest that caution should be exercised in the ext ent of itsapplication. Undoubtedly 
there are m any instances of confabulatory introspec tion.  But confabulatory 
introspection does not work for al spects of our action al the tim e.  A  key issue for 
future research isto try and beter characterise t he target of confabulation, and to 
diferentiate norm al ccess from  exceptions. In gen eral, we know about our own 
voluntary actions, before we m ake them . However, re asons for action seem  to be 
m ore cognitvely m aleable, and susceptible to retr ospective influences.  
 
The idea that the true reasons for action m ay be hi dden has a long history in 
psychology (Freud, 192 3); we wish to suggest one possible explanation why r easons 
m ay be m ore m aleable than agency.  A gency often in volves a direct phenom enal 
experience, of intention- in -action.  W e do not have direct phenom enal experien ce of 
reasons for action in the sam e way. Rather, our ea sons for action, both predictive and 
retrospective, are based on the sam e general sense- m aking processes that w e use to 
understand external events: he tree fel down beca use it was truck by lightning; I 
m arked the exam ination because m y boss aid Ihad t o; Ibought flow ers because I
knew it would m ake her happy.  System atic research on the processes which give us a 
sense of agency, and on the processes which give us  reasons for action, isbeginning, 
after a long post-behaviourist neglect.  CBP wil p lay an im portant part in this 
research, and we hope it can shed further light on the interaction betw een the 
experience of action and the thinking about reasons  for action. 
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